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Abstract
This paper revisits Diamond’s classical impossibility result regarding the ordering of in-
ﬁnite utility streams. We show that if no representability condition is imposed, there do
exist strongly Paretian and ﬁnitely anonymous orderings of intertemporal utility streams
with attractive additional properties. We extend a possibility theorem due to Svensson to
a characterization theorem and we provide characterizations of all strongly Paretian and
ﬁnitely anonymous rankings satisfying the strict transfer principle. In addition, inﬁnite-
horizon extensions of leximin and of utilitarianism are characterized by adding an equity-
preference axiom and ﬁnite translation-scale measurability, respectively, to strong Pareto
and ﬁnite anonymity. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Nos.: D63, D71.
Keywords: Intergenerational justice, multi-period social choice, leximin, utilitarianism.
1 Introduction
Treating generations equally is one of the basic principles in the utilitarian tradition of
moral philosophy. As Sidgwick (1907, p. 414) observes, “the time at which a man ex-
ists cannot aﬀect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; and [. . . ]
the interests of posteriority must concern a Utilitarian as much as those of his contem-
poraries”. This view, which is formally expressed by the anonymity condition, is also
strongly endorsed by Ramsey (1928).
Following Koopmans (1960), Diamond (1965) establishes that anonymity is incompat-
ible with the strong Pareto principle when ordering inﬁnite utility streams. Moreover, he
shows that if anonymity is weakened to ﬁnite anonymity—which restricts the application
of the standard anonymity requirement to situations where utility streams diﬀer in at
most a ﬁnite number of components—and a continuity requirement is added, an impossi-
bility results again. Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003) adapt the well-known strict transfer
principle to the inﬁnite-horizon context. They show that this principle is incompatible
with strong Pareto and continuity even if the ranking is merely required to be acyclical.
Basu and Mitra (2003) show that strong Pareto, ﬁnite anonymity and representability by
a real-valued function are incompatible.
A natural question to ask is what happens if no continuity or representability assump-
tions, which are technical rather than ethical in nature, are imposed. Svensson (1980)
proves that strong Pareto and ﬁnite anonymity are compatible by showing that any or-
dering extension of an inﬁnite-horizon variant of Suppes’ (1966) grading principle satisﬁes
the required axioms. The Suppes grading principle is a quasi-ordering that combines the
Pareto quasi-ordering and ﬁnite anonymity. Given Arrow’s (1951) version of Szpilrajn’s
(1930) extension theorem, this establishes the compatibility result.
Capitalizing on Svensson’s (1980) results, the focus of this paper is on possibilities
rather than impossibilities. We show that, if neither representability nor continuity as-
sumptions are imposed, orderings of inﬁnite utility streams with attractive properties that
go beyond the grading principle exist. Especially in an inﬁnite-dimensional framework,
technical requirements such as representability and continuity can be considered overly
demanding and, as a consequence, the observation that the orderings characterized in
this paper fail to satisfy them does not appear to be a serious shortcoming. This view is
conﬁrmed by the fact that the set of rules we characterize include orderings where vio-
lations of representability or continuity only occur when comparing utility streams that
diﬀer in inﬁnitely many components. Thus, we think that the results of this paper are
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very encouraging.
We ﬁrst strengthen Svensson’s result to a characterization theorem by establishing
that any ordering satisfying the two axioms must be an extension of the inﬁnite-horizon
Suppes grading principle. We then show that the compatibility survives even if the strict
transfer principle is added to strong Pareto and ﬁnite anonymity. This is accomplished
by characterizing all orderings with these properties and establishing the non-emptiness
of this class. Finally, we show how some well-known characterization results appearing
in ﬁnite-population social-choice theory can be extended to the inﬁnite-horizon model.
In particular, we employ an equity-preference condition to characterize inﬁnite-horizon
versions of the leximin principle and we use a suitable variant of translation-scale mea-
surability to axiomatize analogous extensions of utilitarianism.
2 Deﬁnitions
The set of inﬁnite utility streams is X = RN, where R denotes the set of all real numbers
and N denotes the set of all natural numbers. A typical element of X is an inﬁnite-
dimensional vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn, . . .) and, for n ∈ N, we write x−n = (x1, . . . , xn)
and x+n = (xn+1, xn+2, . . .). The standard interpretation of x ∈ X is that of a countably
inﬁnite utility stream where xn is the utility experienced in period n ∈ N. Of course,
other interpretations are possible—for example, xn could be the utility of an individual
in a countably inﬁnite population.
Our notation for vector inequalities on X is as follows. For all x, y ∈ X, (i) x ≥ y
if xn ≥ yn for all n ∈ N; (ii) x > y if x ≥ y and x = y; (iii) x  y if xn > yn for all
n ∈ N. For n ∈ N and x ∈ X, (x(1), . . . , x(n)) is a rank-ordered permutation of x−n such
that x(1) ≤ . . . ≤ x(n), ties being broken arbitrarily.
R ⊆ X × X is a weak preference relation on X with strict preference P (R) and
indiﬀerence relation I(R). A quasi-ordering is a reﬂexive and transitive relation, and
an ordering is a complete quasi-ordering. Analogously, a partial order is an asymmetric
and transitive relation, and a linear order is a complete partial order. Let R and R′ be
relations on X. R′ is an extension of R if R ⊆ R′ and P (R) ⊆ P (R′). If an extension
R′ of R is an ordering, we call it an ordering extension of R, and if R′ is an extension of
R that is a linear order, we refer to it as a linear order extension of R. The transitive
closure of a relation R is denoted by R, that is, for all x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ R if there exist
K ∈ N and z0, . . . , zK ∈ X such that x = z0, (zk−1, zk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and
zK = y.
2
A ﬁnite permutation of N is a bijection ρ:N → N such that there exists m ∈ N
with ρ(n) = n for all n ∈ N \ {1, . . . , m}. The corresponding ﬁnite permutation matrix
Bρ = (bρij)i,j∈N is deﬁned by letting, for all i ∈ N, bρiρ(i) = 1 and bρij = 0 for all j ∈ N\{ρ(i)}.
Finite permutation matrices are special cases of ﬁnite bistochastic matrices. A ﬁnite
bistochastic matrix is a matrix B = (bij)i,j∈N such that there exists m ∈ N such that
bij ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m},
∑m
i=1 bij = 1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m},
∑m
j=1 bij = 1 for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, bii = 1 for all i ∈ N \ {1, . . . , m} and bij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N \ {1, . . . , m}
with i = j. Finite bistochastic matrices will be convenient in the proof of Theorem 2.
The following axioms are used in this paper.
Strong Pareto: For all x, y ∈ X, if x > y, then (x, y) ∈ P (R).
Finite anonymity: For all x ∈ X and for all ﬁnite permutations ρ of N,
(Bρx, x) ∈ I(R).
Strict transfer principle: For all x, y ∈ X and for all n,m ∈ N, if xk = yk for all
k ∈ N \ {n,m}, ym > xm ≥ xn > yn and xn + xm = yn + ym, then (x, y) ∈ P (R).
Equity preference: For all x, y ∈ X and for all n,m ∈ N, if xk = yk for all k ∈ N\{n,m}
and ym > xm > xn > yn, then (x, y) ∈ R.
Finite translation-scale measurability: For all x, y, z ∈ X and for all m ∈ N, if
xn = yn for all n ∈ N \ {1, . . . , m}, then
(x + z, y + z) ∈ R ⇔ (x, y) ∈ R.
Strong Pareto and ﬁnite anonymity are the standard axioms used in the literature on
ranking inﬁnite utility streams.
The strict transfer principle is the natural analogue of the corresponding condition for
ﬁnite streams. See also Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003).
Equity preference is the extension of Hammond’s (1976) equity axiom to the inﬁnite-
horizon environment. d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) use a stronger axiom by requiring
(x, y) ∈ P (R) rather than merely (x, y) ∈ R in the conclusion of the axiom. In the
presence of strong Pareto, the two axioms are equivalent. Moreover, strong Pareto and
equity preference together imply the following property which, in turn, obviously implies
the strict transfer principle.
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Strict equity preference: For all x, y ∈ X and for all n,m ∈ N, if xk = yk for all
k ∈ N \ {n,m} and ym > xm ≥ xn > yn, then (x, y) ∈ P (R).
To see that strict equity preference is implied by strong Pareto and equity preference,
suppose that R satisﬁes the ﬁrst two axioms, and let x, y ∈ X and n,m ∈ N be such that
xk = yk for all k ∈ N \ {n,m} and ym > xm ≥ xn > yn. Let z ∈ X be such that zk =
xk = yk for all k ∈ N \ {n,m} and xn > zm > zn > yn. By strong Pareto, (x, z) ∈ P (R)
and by equity preference, (z, y) ∈ R. Thus, transitivity implies (x, y) ∈ P (R) and strict
equity preference is satisﬁed.
Finite translation-scale measurability imposes restrictions on the informational con-
tents of utility streams. It requires that utilities are unique up to independent translations.
This is the natural adaptation of the corresponding axiom known from ﬁnite-population
social-choice theory to our environment. Note that the axiom only applies to comparisons
of utility streams that diﬀer in at most a ﬁnite number of components.
Szpilrajn’s (1930) fundamental result establishes that every partial order has a linear
order extension. Arrow (1951, p. 64) presents a variant of Szpilrajn’s theorem stating that
every quasi-ordering has an ordering extension; see also Hansson (1968). This implies that
the sets of orderings characterized in the theorems of the following sections are non-empty
and, therefore, our results indeed show the compatibility of the stated systems of axioms.
3 The inﬁnite-horizon Suppes grading principle
The Suppes (1966) grading principle combines the requirements of strong Pareto and
anonymity into a criterion for establishing a partial social ranking. Adapted to the multi-
period framework, the Suppes quasi-ordering RS on X is deﬁned as follows. For all
x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ RS if there exists a ﬁnite permutation ρ of N such that x ≥ Bρy.
Svensson (1980, Theorem 2) shows that any ordering extension of RS satisﬁes strong
Pareto and ﬁnite anonymity. We formulate a stronger result by establishing that these
ordering extensions of RS are the only orderings on X with these properties.
Theorem 1 An ordering R on X satisﬁes strong Pareto and ﬁnite anonymity if and only
if R is an ordering extension of RS.
Proof. ‘If.’ That any ordering extension of RS satisﬁes strong Pareto and ﬁnite equity
is shown in Svensson (1980, Theorem 2).
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‘Only if.’ Now suppose R is an ordering that satisﬁes the two axioms. We prove that
R is an ordering extension of RS.
Let x, y ∈ X be such that (x, y) ∈ RS. Thus, there exists a ﬁnite permutation ρ of N
such that x ≥ Bρy. By ﬁnite anonymity, (Bρy, y) ∈ I(R) ⊆ R. If x = Bρy, (x,Bρy) ∈ R
follows from the reﬂexivity of R. If x > Bρy, strong Pareto implies (x,Bρy) ∈ P (R) ⊆ R.
Because R is transitive, we obtain (x, y) ∈ R in all cases.
Now let x, y ∈ X be such that (x, y) ∈ P (RS). By deﬁnition, there exists a ﬁnite
permutation ρ of N such that x ≥ Bρy and there exists no ﬁnite permutation ρ′ of N
such that y ≥ Bρ′x. As shown above, (x, y) ∈ RS implies (x, y) ∈ R. If x = Bρy,
letting ρ′ = ρ−1 immediately yields a contradiction. Thus, x > Bρy. By strong Pareto,
(x,Bρy) ∈ P (R). Finite anonymity implies (Bρy, y) ∈ I(R) and, by transitivity, we
obtain (x, y) ∈ P (R). Thus, R is an extension of RS.
Because R is an ordering by assumption, this implies that R is an ordering extension
of RS.
4 Transfer-sensitive inﬁnite-horizon orderings
Now we examine the consequences of adding the strict transfer principle to our list of
axioms. We provide a strengthening of Svensson’s (1980) possibility result by showing
that the three resulting axioms are compatible. Moreover, we characterize all orderings
with these properties.
To deﬁne this class of orderings, consider ﬁrst the following relation RT . For all
x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ RT if there exist n,m ∈ N such that xk = yk for all k ∈ N \ {n,m},
ym > xm ≥ xn > yn and xn + xm = yn + ym. This relation captures the requirements
imposed by the strict transfer principle. Clearly, P (RT ) = RT . Note that if (x, y) ∈ RT ,
then there exists a ﬁnite bistochastic matrix B such that x = By. This matrix is obtained
by letting bnm = bmn = (xn − yn)/(ym − yn), bnn = bmm = (xm − yn)/(ym − yn), bni =
bin = bmi = bim = 0 for all i ∈ N \ {n,m}, bii = 1 for all i ∈ N \ {n,m} and bij = 0 for all
i, j ∈ N \ {n,m} with i = j.
Because, in addition, we want our ordering to satisfy strong Pareto and ﬁnite anonymity,
the relation RS must be respected as well. Finally, because we only consider transitive
relations, the transitive closure of the union of these two relations appears in the deﬁnition
of the relevant class of orderings. Clearly, the transitive closure RS ∪ RT of RS ∪RT is a
quasi-ordering: reﬂexivity follows from the reﬂexivity of RS and transitivity is satisﬁed by
deﬁnition. We obtain the following characterization of the class of all ordering extensions
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of RS ∪ RT .
Theorem 2 An ordering R on X satisﬁes strong Pareto, ﬁnite anonymity and the strict
transfer principle if and only if R is an ordering extension of RS ∪ RT .
Proof. ‘If.’ We ﬁrst prove that RS ∪ RT is an extension of both RS and RT . It is
immediate that RS ⊆ RS ∪ RT and RT ⊆ RS ∪RT , so we only need to establish the set
inclusions
P (RS) ⊆ P (RS ∪ RT ) (1)
and
P (RT ) ⊆ P (RS ∪RT ). (2)
To prove (1), suppose that (x, y) ∈ P (RS). This implies (x, y) ∈ RS ∪RT . By way of
contradiction, suppose that (y, x) ∈ RS ∪ RT . Thus, there exist a ﬁnite permutation ρ of
N, K ∈ N and z0, . . . , zK ∈ X such that x > Bρy, y = z0, (zk−1, zk) ∈ RS ∪ RT for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and zK = x. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. If (zk−1, zk) ∈ RS, it follows that there
exists a ﬁnite permutation ρk of N such that zk−1 ≥ Bρkzk. If (zk−1, zk) ∈ RT , it follows
that there exists a ﬁnite bistochastic matrix B such that zk−1 = Bzk. Suppose ﬁrst that,
whenever (zk−1, zk) ∈ RS, we have zk−1 = Bρkzk for some ﬁnite permutation ρk. Because
the set of ﬁnite bistochastic matrices is closed under matrix multiplication, it follows that
y = B0x for some ﬁnite bistochastic matrix B0. Let m ∈ N be such that b0ii = bρii = 1
for all i ∈ N \ {1, . . . , m}. Because y = B0x, it follows that ∑mi=1 yi =
∑m
i=1 xi. But
x > Bρy implies
∑m
i=1 xi >
∑m
i=1 yi, a contradiction. If some of the inequalities are strict,
an analogous contradiction emerges. Therefore, (y, x) ∈ RS ∪RT is impossible and (1)
follows. The proof of (2) is analogous.
Next, we prove that any ordering extension of RS ∪ RT satisﬁes the required axioms.
Suppose R is such an ordering extension.
We begin with strong Pareto. Suppose that x > y for some x, y ∈ X. This implies
(x, y) ∈ P (RS) and, by (1), (x, y) ∈ P (RS ∪RT ). Because R is an ordering extension of
RS ∪ RT , it follows that (x, y) ∈ P (R) and strong Pareto is satisﬁed.
To establish ﬁnite anonymity, let x ∈ X and let ρ be any ﬁnite permutation of N. This
implies (Bρx, x) ∈ I(RS) and, because RS ⊆ RS ∪RT ⊆ R, we obtain (Bρx, x) ∈ I(R).
Finally, we prove that the strict transfer principle is satisﬁed. Suppose x, y ∈ X
and n,m ∈ N are such that xk = yk for all k ∈ N \ {n,m}, ym > xm ≥ xn > yn and
xn + xm = yn + ym. This implies (x, y) ∈ P (RT ) and, by (2) and the assumption that R
is an ordering extension of RS ∪ RT , we obtain (x, y) ∈ P (R).
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‘Only if.’ Suppose R satisﬁes the three axioms of the theorem statement. To prove
that R is an ordering extension of RS ∪ RT , suppose ﬁrst that (x, y) ∈ RS ∪ RT . By
deﬁnition, there exist K ∈ N and z0, . . . , zK ∈ X such that x = z0, (zk−1, zk) ∈ RS ∪ RT
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and zK = y. By Theorem 1, (zk−1, zk) ∈ R follows whenever
(zk−1, zk) ∈ RS and, by the strict transfer principle, (zk−1, zk) ∈ R follows whenever
(zk−1, zk) ∈ RT . Because R is transitive, it follows that (x, y) ∈ R.
Now suppose that (x, y) ∈ P (RS ∪ RT ). By deﬁnition, there exist K ∈ N and
z0, . . . , zK ∈ X such that x = z0, (zk−1, zk) ∈ RS ∪ RT for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and
zK = y. Moreover, at least one of these preferences must be strict because otherwise
we would have (y, x) ∈ RS ∪ RT , contradicting (x, y) ∈ P (RS ∪ RT ). If the strict prefer-
ence is such that (zk−1, zk) ∈ P (RS), (zk−1, zk) ∈ P (R) follows from Theorem 1. If the
strict preference is such that (zk−1, zk) ∈ P (RT ), (zk−1, zk) ∈ P (R) follows immediately
from the strict transfer principle. Therefore, in either case, the transitivity of R implies
(x, y) ∈ P (R). This completes the proof that R is an ordering extension of RS ∪RT .
5 Inﬁnite-horizon leximin
If the strict transfer principle is replaced by equity preference (which, in the presence
of strong Pareto, is a strengthening), the only remaining orderings are inﬁnite-horizon
versions of the leximin criterion. Let n ∈ N. We denote the usual leximin ordering on Rn
by Rn , that is, for all x, y ∈ X,
(x−n, y−n) ∈ Rn ⇔ x−n is a permutation of y−n or there exists m ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
x(k) = y(k) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {m, . . . , n} and x(m) > y(m).
Again, let n ∈ N and deﬁne a relation RnL ⊆ X×X by letting, for all x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ RnL
if (x−n, y−n) ∈ Rn and x+n ≥ y+n. It is straightforward to verify that RnL is a quasi-
ordering for all n ∈ N. Finally, let RL = ∪n∈NRnL. This relation is a quasi-ordering but
it is not complete—some inﬁnite utility streams are not ranked by RL. Our next result
characterizes all ordering extensions of RL.
Theorem 3 An ordering R on X satisﬁes strong Pareto, ﬁnite anonymity and equity
preference if and only if R is an ordering extension of RL.
Proof. ‘If.’ First, we prove that, for all n,m ∈ N such that m > n,
RnL ⊆ RmL (3)
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and
P (RnL) ⊆ P (RmL ). (4)
Let n,m ∈ N be such that m > n.
To prove (3), suppose that (x, y) ∈ RnL. By deﬁnition, (x−n, y−n) ∈ Rn and x+n ≥ y+n.
Hence (x−m, y−m) ∈ Rm and x+m ≥ y+m, that is, (x, y) ∈ RmL .
To establish (4), suppose that (x, y) ∈ P (RnL). By deﬁnition, at least one of the
following two statements is true:
(x−n, y−n) ∈ P (Rn ) and x+n ≥ y+n; (5)
(x−n, y−n) ∈ Rn and x+n > y+n. (6)
By (3), it follows that (x, y) ∈ RmL . To prove that (x, y) ∈ P (RmL ), suppose, by way of
contradiction, that (y, x) ∈ RmL . Then, by deﬁnition,
(x−n, y−n) ∈ I(Rn ) and x+n = y+n,
contradicting (5) and (6).
Next, we prove that RL is a quasi-ordering. Reﬂexivity is immediate because, for all
x ∈ X, (x, x) ∈ RnL for all n ∈ N and hence (x, x) ∈ RL. To prove that RL is transitive,
suppose that (x, y), (y, z) ∈ RL. By deﬁnition, there exist n,m ∈ N such that (x, y) ∈ RnL
and (y, z) ∈ RmL . Let k = max{n,m}. By (3), (x, y), (y, z) ∈ RkL and by the transitivity
of RkL, (x, z) ∈ RkL which, in turn, implies (x, z) ∈ RL.
We now show that, for all x, y ∈ X,
(x, y) ∈ P (RL) ⇔ ∃n ∈ N such that (x, y) ∈ P (RnL). (7)
Suppose ﬁrst that (x, y) ∈ P (RL). By deﬁnition, there exists n ∈ N such that (x, y) ∈
RnL. Moreover, (y, x) ∈ RnL because otherwise we obtain (y, x) ∈ RL by deﬁnition and
thus a contradiction to our hypothesis that (x, y) ∈ P (RL). Hence (x, y) ∈ P (RnL).
Conversely, suppose that there exists n ∈ N such that (x, y) ∈ P (RnL). Suppose there
exists m ∈ N such that (y, x) ∈ RmL . Because (x, y) ∈ P (RnL), (4) implies n > m. But then
(3) implies (y, x) ∈ RnL, a contradiction. We conclude that (x, y) ∈ RnL and (y, x) ∈ RmL
for all m ∈ N. By deﬁnition, this implies (x, y) ∈ P (RL).
Now let R be an ordering extension of RL. We complete the proof of the ‘if’ part by
showing that R satisﬁes the required axioms.
To establish that strong Pareto is satisﬁed, suppose that x, y ∈ X are such that x > y.
Let n = min{m ∈ N | xm > ym}. By deﬁnition, (x, y) ∈ P (RnL). By (7), (x, y) ∈ P (RL)
and, because R is an ordering extension of RL, we obtain (x, y) ∈ P (R).
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Next, we show that ﬁnite anonymity is satisﬁed. Let x ∈ X and let ρ be a ﬁnite
permutation of N. By deﬁnition, there exists m ∈ N such that ρ(n) = n for all n ∈
N \ {1, . . . , m}. By deﬁnition of RmL , (Bρx, x) ∈ I(RmL ). By deﬁnition of RL, this implies
(Bρx, x) ∈ I(RL). Because R is an ordering extension of RL, we obtain (Bρx, x) ∈ I(R).
Finally, we show that equity preference is satisﬁed. Consider x, y ∈ X and n,m ∈ N
such that xk = yk for all k ∈ N \ {n,m} and ym > xm > xn > yn. Let j = max{n,m}.
By deﬁnition of RjL, we obtain (x, y) ∈ RjL. By (7), (x, y) ∈ RL and, because R is an
ordering extension of RL, (x, y) ∈ R.
‘Only if.’ Suppose R is an ordering on X satisfying the three axioms of the theorem
statement. Fix n ∈ N and z ∈ X and deﬁne the relation Q(n, z) ⊆ Rn × Rn as follows.
For all x, y ∈ X,
(x−n, y−n) ∈ Q(n, z) ⇔ ((x−n, z+n), (y−n, z+n)) ∈ R.
Q(n, z) is an ordering because R is. Furthermore, it is clear that
(x−n, y−n) ∈ P (Q(n, z))⇔ ((x−n, z+n), (y−n, z+n)) ∈ P (R) (8)
for all x, y ∈ X. The three axioms imply that Q(n, z) must satisfy the n-person versions
of the axioms and, using Hammond’s (1976, Theorem 7.2) characterization of n-person
leximin (see also d’Aspremont and Gevers, 1977, Theorem 5), it follows that
Q(n, z) = Rn . (9)
Because n and z were chosen arbitrarily, (9) is true for all n ∈ N and for any z ∈ X.
By way of contradiction, suppose R is not an ordering extension of RL. There are two
possible cases.
Case 1. There exist x, y ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ RL and (y, x) ∈ P (R). By deﬁnition
of RL, there exists n ∈ N such that (x, y) ∈ RnL, that is,
(x−n, y−n) ∈ Rn and x+n ≥ y+n.
Hence, by (9),
(x−n, y−n) ∈ Q(n, z) and x+n ≥ y+n
for all z ∈ X. Choosing z = y and using the deﬁnition of Q(n, z), it follows that
((x−n, y+n), (y−n, y+n)) ∈ R. Because x+n ≥ y+n, reﬂexivity (if x+n = y+n) or the con-
junction of strong Pareto and transitivity (if x+n > y+n) implies ((x−n, x+n), (y−n, y+n)) =
(x, y) ∈ R, a contradiction.
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Case 2. There exist x, y ∈ X such that (x, y) ∈ P (RL) and (y, x) ∈ R. By (7), there
exists n ∈ N such that (x, y) ∈ P (RnL). Thus, (5) or (6) is true. If (5) holds, (9) implies
(x−n, y−n) ∈ P (Q(n, z)) and x+n ≥ y+n
for all z ∈ X. Setting z = y and using (8), we obtain ((x−n, y+n), (y−n, y+n)) ∈ P (R) and,
using reﬂexivity or strong Pareto and transitivity as in case 1, we obtain (x, y) ∈ P (R),
a contradiction. If (6) holds, we proceed as in case 1.
6 Inﬁnite-horizon utilitarianism
The technique employed in the previous section to characterize inﬁnite-horizon versions
of leximin can also be applied to a characterization of utilitarian orderings. This is an
interesting observation because it demonstrates that the necessary violations of continuity
and representability are restricted to comparisons of genuinely diﬀerent inﬁnite utility
streams—streams diﬀering in at most ﬁnitely many components can be ranked using
well-behaved criteria. To deﬁne inﬁnite-horizon utilitarian orderings, we begin by letting,
for all n ∈ N and for all x, y ∈ X,
(x−n, y−n) ∈ Rnu ⇔
n∑
i=1
xi ≥
n∑
i=1
yi
and
(x, y) ∈ RnU ⇔ (x−n, y−n) ∈ Rnu and x+n ≥ y+n.
Clearly, RnU is a quasi-ordering for all n ∈ N. Now deﬁne RU = ∪n∈NRnU . As is the case
for RL, RU is a quasi-ordering but it is not complete. However, as is straightforward to
verify, if x and y diﬀer in at most a ﬁnite number of components, they are comparable
according to RU .
Our ﬁnal result characterizes all ordering extensions of RU .
Theorem 4 An ordering R on X satisﬁes strong Pareto, ﬁnite anonymity and ﬁnite
translation-scale measurability if and only if R is an ordering extension of RU .
Proof. ‘If.’ All steps in the ‘if’ part of the proof of Theorem 3 go through if Rn , R
n
L
and RL are replaced with R
n
u, R
n
U and RU , respectively, except, of course, for the proof
of equity preference. It remains to establish that any ordering extension of RU satisﬁes
ﬁnite translation-scale measurability. Let x, y, z ∈ X and m ∈ N be such that xn = yn
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for all n ∈ N \ {1, . . . , m}. By deﬁnition, x and y are ranked by RU because they diﬀer
in at most a ﬁnite number of components, and the same is true for x + z and y + z.
Thus, because R is an ordering extension of RU , the ranking of x and y (x+ z and y + z,
respectively) according to R is the same as the ranking of x and y (x + z and y + z,
respectively) according to RU , and we obtain
(x + z, y + z) ∈ R ⇔ (x + z, y + z) ∈ RU
⇔ ∃n ∈ N such that (x + z, y + z) ∈ RnU
⇔ ∃n ∈ N such that
n∑
i=1
(xi + zi) ≥
n∑
i=1
(yi + zi) and
x+n + z+n ≥ y+n + z+n
⇔ ∃n ∈ N such that
n∑
i=1
xi ≥
n∑
i=1
yi and x+n ≥ y+n
⇔ ∃n ∈ N such that (x, y) ∈ RnU
⇔ (x, y) ∈ RU
⇔ (x, y) ∈ R.
‘Only if.’ Again, all steps of the ‘only-if’ part of Theorem 3 go through, except that the
set of n-person axioms that are implied for the relation Q(n, z) is composed of n-person
strong Pareto, n-person anonymity and n-person translation-scale measurability. Now we
can invoke Theorem 3 of d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977), which remains true if cardi-
nal unit comparability is weakened to translation-scale measurability—see, for instance,
Theorem 12 in Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2002], to conclude that Q(n, z) = Rnu.
The remainder of the proof is identical to that of Theorem 3.
The restriction of ﬁnite translation-scale measurability to utility streams that diﬀer
in at most a ﬁnite number of components is important for the conclusion of Theorem 4.
Without that restriction, the non-constructive technique employed in the proof does not
allow us to conclude that any arbitrary ordering extension of RU satisﬁes the resulting
stronger axiom. It is interesting to compare this feature of the axiom to a related ob-
servation regarding ﬁnite anonymity: as shown by Diamond (1965), limiting the scope
of the ﬁnite-anonymity axiom is crucial as well because, without the restriction to ﬁnite
permutations, an incompatibility with strong Pareto emerges.
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7 Concluding remarks
The results of this paper establish the existence of orderings of inﬁnite utility streams sat-
isfying attractive properties. In addition, we provide characterizations of various classes
of such orderings. Given the nature of the proofs, we do not provide explicit constructions
of these orderings. However, this feature is by no means unique to our approach. Ex-
tending quasi-orderings to orderings often requires non-constructive techniques; see, for
example, Richter’s (1966) use of Szpilrajn’s (1930) extension theorem in the context of
rational choice.
A plausible conclusion to be drawn from this paper is that impossibility results such as
those of Diamond (1965), Basu and Mitra (2003) and Suzumura and Shinotsuka (2003)
are, to a large extent, caused by continuity or representability assumptions. Without
these rather restrictive requirements, evaluation rules satisfying attractive axioms can be
characterized. Most notably, even orderings such as the inﬁnite-horizon variants of utili-
tarianism characterized in the previous section become available and, therefore, violations
of representability or continuity are limited to genuinely inﬁnite utility streams. In our
view, this conﬁrms that the state of aﬀairs in this area is not as disappointing and negative
as has been suggested by the impossibility results of many earlier contributions.
The technique employed to characterize inﬁnite-horizon versions of leximin and util-
itarianism appears to be very powerful and applicable to the extension of other ﬁnite-
population social-choice rules. However, as the discussion at the end of the previous
section demonstrates, care needs to be taken in formulating suitable extensions of ﬁnite-
population axioms and, thus, the methodology employed here cannot be applied in a
mechanical fashion. We hope that our approach will stimulate further research in the
area of intergenerational social choice by identifying alternative sets of attractive axioms
and characterizing the social orderings that satisfy them.
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